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I. Introduct i on
Ef f i ciency w age theory suggest s that  em ployers can imp r ove t he product i vi t y or qual i t y of
t hei r   wo r kforce by payi ng wa g e s   i n excess of  t he opport uni t y cost  of  l abour.   Ther e are t wo
school s of thought  as to how  t hese w age prem ia operate. The ‘ i nst r um ent ali st’  vi ew  is that
em ployees choose  how   hard  t o  wo r k  by  equat i ng  t he  ma r gi nal   costs and  benefi t s of  shir ki ng.
W age prem ia are thus carr ot s that  em ployers use, along w i t h t he st i ck of di sm issal,  t o
encourage an opt i ma l   suppl y  of  wo r k  eff ort   [ Shapi r o  and  St i gl i t z ( 1984),   Bowl es ( 1985)] .   The
‘ sociol ogi cal’   approach,  i n cont r ast,   argues t hat   t he prem ia r epresent  a ‘ gi f t ’   by t he f i r m  t hat
appeals to norms  o f  loyal t y and m ut ual  obl i gat i on on t he part  of it s w orkforce [Ak e r l of
( 1982)] .  A ccordi ng t o t hi s view  eff i ciency w ages eli cit  eff ort  by creati ng a cli ma t e of co-
operati on and r eciproci t y,   r ather  t han by enteri ng an i nst r um ent al  calculati on of  t he expected
net   benefi t   of  shir ki ng.
I t  is dif f i cult  to t est eff i ciency w age theory si nce standard com peti t i ve m odel s also
predict  a posi t i ve  corr elati on  bet w een product i vi t y  and  wa g e s .   Mo r eover,   one  w oul d  expect  t o
f i nd such paym ent s in si t uat i ons w here it  is dif f i cult  to observe,  and t hus m easure, wo r ker
perf orm ance. Econom i sts have t herefore att em pted to t est the t heory by focusi ng on t he
r elati onshi p  bet w een wa g e s   and  ot her  f orms   of  eff ort   procurem ent.   For   exam ple,  i f   eff i ciency
wa g e sa r e successful   i n eli cit i ng eff ort   t hen,   ceteris pari bus,   one w oul d expect  f i r ms   payi ng
such prem ia t o  i nvest   f ew er  r esources i n  mo n i t ori ng  wo r ker  behavi our.
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An  a l t ernat i ve m et hod of imp r ovi ng w orker product i vi t y i s to di vest  a share of the
f i r m i nt o t he hands of wo r kers. R ecent years have w i t nessed a resurgence of int erest in
em ployee shari ng.  Re - ki ndl ed by W eit zm an’s (1985) purport ed m acroeconom i c benefi t s of
profi t  shari ng,  att enti on has t urned t ow ards t he m ore readil y di scerni bl e, and ori gi nal l y
l auded,   mi croeconom i c benefi t s of  em ployee shari ng broadl y defi ned [ We i t zm an and Kr use,
( 1990),   Bl i nder  ( 1990)] .
1  See,  f or  exam ple,  Bowl es ( 1985),   Ca l vo  ( 1979)  and  Eat on  and  Wh i t e ( 1983).   I t   i s possibl e,  how ever,   t hat   hi gh
wa g e s  a r e a necessary com pensati ng di f f erenti al f or occupat i ons t hat  r equi r e distasteful l y hi gh rates of
supervi sion [ A oki   ( 1984)] .   Evi dence of  a posi t i ve ( negat i ve)  r elati onshi p bet w een wa g e s   and m oni t ori ng i n t he
Swedi sh publ i c ( pri vat e)  sector  i s obt ained  by  Ar ai  ( 1994).2
Empl oyee shari ng  has  i mp l i cati ons  f or  bot h  i nst r um ent al  and  gi f t - exchange m odel s of
eff i ciency wa g e s .   I n  t erms   of  t he  f orme r ,   a shari ng  schem e w oul d  di r ectl y  r educe t he  ma r gi nal
benefi t  of shir ki ng.  In t he ext r em e case, a self - em ployed w orker has no i ncenti ve t o shi r k.
The t em ptati on t o fr ee ri de renders the i ssue som ew hat less pell uci d w hen a w ork group i s
consi dered, but  even here the exchange envi r onm ent  i s aff ected. Di vest i ng part  of t he
enterpri se i s perhaps t he mo s t   generous gi f t   a f i r m  can off er  i t s wo r kforce and i f   i t   i s via an
exchange of gi f t s that  w age prem ia eli cit  eff ort ,  then t he quest i on ari ses as to t he m argi nal
ut i l i t y  t hat   wo r kers deri ve  f r om   such gi f t s.
An  i nt eresti ng,  yet  hi t hert o unexpl ored, quest i on t hus ari ses as to t he relati onshi p
bet w een em ployee shari ng and t he w age-m oni t ori ng nexus.  A pr i ori  one w oul d expect
shari ng t o m i t i gat e the need t o m oni t or.  Wh e t her it  augm ent s or assuages the relati onshi p
bet w een pay and supervi sion,   and t hus i t s eff ect  on t he shape of  t he t r ade off ,   i s r ather  l ess
obvi ous.
I n t hi s paper  we   present  t he f i r st  cross-pl ant/ t i me   seri es study of  t he eff ects of  profi t
shari ng and em pl oyee share ow nership pl ans (ESOPs )  on t he relati onshi p bet w een
supervi sion  and  pay.   Ou r   r esult s suggest   an i nverse r elati onshi p  bet w een supervi sion  and  pay
across bot h shari ng and non-shari ng fi r ms ,  alt hough t he t r ade-off  i s som ew hat assuaged
wi t hi n t he forme r  - i . e. an increase in rem unerati on i nduces a relati vel y sm al l er cut i n
m oni t ori ng am ongst  shari ng fi r ms  t han am ongst  t hei r  non-shari ng count erpart s ceteris
pari bus.  Thi s w oul d appear to cont r adict inst r um ent al eff i ciency w age considerati ons,  but
coul d be r ati onal i sed wi t hi n a gi f t - exchange cont ext.   I n t erms   of  specif i c shari ng schem es,  i t
appears t hat   em ployee share ow nership  pl ans are r elati vel y  mo r e successful   i n  all eviati ng  t he
need t o  m oni t or.
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The paper i s set out  as fol l ow s:  Secti on II  di scusses som e background i ssues
concerni ng t he relati onshi p bet w een pay,  supervi sion,  and shari ng.  Sect i on II I  sets out  the
2  We   use t he t erms   ‘ supervi sion’  and ‘ m oni t ori ng’  i nt erchangeably i n wh a t   f ol l ow s.   Al t hough supervi sors have
di f f erent  f unct i ons  at  di f f erent  f i r ms ,   and  f i r ms   ma y   ut i l i se ot her  f orms   of  t echnol ogy  t o  m oni t or  em ployees ( e.g.
com put ers),   t he  supervi sor- t o-staff   r ati o  i s l i kel y  t o  be  hi ghl y  corr elated wi t h  t he  extent  of  em ployee m oni t ori ng
[ Gr oshen  and  Kr uegger  ( 1990)] .3
t heoreti cal  underpi nni ng t o our  study wh i l st  Secti on I V  descri bes our  dat a and me t hodol ogy.
Ou r   em pir i cal  r esult s are presented i n  Secti on  V  and  our  f i nal   c o mme n t s i n  Secti on  VI .
II. B ackground
W ages  and  M oni t ori ng
Econom i sts have l ong recogni sed that  there are subst anti al di f f erences in t he rew ards t o
simi l ar  occupat i ons across i ndust r i es.  I t   i s onl y r ecentl y,   how ever,   t hat   t hey have associated
t hese vari ati ons wi t h di f f erences i n m oni t ori ng.   I n one of  t he earl i est  studi es Du n l op ( 1957)
observed t hat   t he hi ghest   payi ng t r ucki ng f i r m  i n Bos t on i n 1951 wa s   payi ng i t s dri vers 1. 88
t i me s  t hat  of it s low est  payi ng com peti t or.  At  any poi nt  in t i m e such a range of pay coul d
r efl ect a tr ansit ory dem and shock dri vi ng up w ages i n part i cular indust r i es along short - r un
i nel asti c l abour  suppl y  curves.   I f   t hi s we r e t he  case,  how ever,   one  w oul d  not   expect  t o  see t he
sam e i ndust r i es r em aini ng at  t he t op ( or  bot t om )  of  t he di str i but i on decade aft er  decade.  Ye t
i ndust r y w age di f f erenti als over the past  century have been rem arkabl y persistent [see, for
exam ple,  Ga r bari no ( 1950),   Sl i chter  ( 1950),   Cul l en ( 1956),   Re de r   ( 1962),   Be l l   and Fr eem an
( 1985)  and  Kr ueger  and  S u mme r s ( 1987)] .
Two  r egul ari t i es em erge f r om  t he vari ous att em pts t o account   f or  such assidui t y vis.
hi gher wa g e s  a r e usual l y associated w it h:  (i )  hi gher profi t s and /  or concentr ati on [see
Di ckens and K atz (1987) and K rueger and Sum m ers (1987)] ;  and (i i ) ,  larger pl ant and /  or
f i r m s i ze [see B row n and M edoff  ( 1985),  Kr use (1992)] .  The f i r st f i ndi ng m i ght  be
i nt erpreted as support  for Ak e r l of’ s (1982) gi f t - exchange m odel  of eff i ciency w ages.
3 An d
assum ing t hat   m oni t ori ng costs i ncrease wi t h pl ant  size,  t he second w oul d seem  t o confi r m
t he  wa g e - m oni t ori ng  t r ade-off   predicted by  Shapi r o  and  St i gl i t z ( 1984).
4
M easuri ng t he t r ade-off  bet w een w ages and m oni t ori ng expl i cit l y,  how ever,  has
proved almo s t   as vexi ng as studyi ng t he di r ect  eff ect  of  hi gh wa g e s   on em ployee behavi our.
Tw o probl em s are part i cularl y i r ksom e.  The f i r st concerns om i t t ed vari able bias. In m any
3  I t   coul d also be t he case t hat   t here are unobserved qual i t y di f f erences i n wo r kers i nduci ng bot h hi gher  profi t s
and  hi gher  wa g e s   [ Ca i n  ( 1976)] .
4  St udi es t hat   f i nd expl i cit   evidence of  a wa g e - supervi sion t r ade-off   i ncl ude Kr ueger  ( 1991)  and Kr use ( 1992).
Som ewhat   am biguous  r esult s are r eport ed i n  N eal  ( 1993),   Fi t zroy  and  Kr aft   ( 1986)  and  Br unel l o  ( 1995).4
em ploym ent  relati onshi ps a si ngl e em ployer opt i ma l l y chooses bot h t he l evel of wa g e s  a n d
supervi sion.  Such si mu l t aneit y i s probl em ati c because om it t ed aspects of hum an resource
pol i cies that  aff ect wa g e s  ( e.g.  em ployee screening or t r aini ng procedures) ma y  a l so be
corr elated w it h supervi sory i nt ensit y and m i ght ,  t herefore, ma s k  t he underl yi ng t r ade-off
bet w een wa g e s   and  supervi sion.
5
The second di f f i cult y i s the m easurem ent of supervi sory i nt ensit y.  Mo s t  studi es
m easure supervi sion by t he rati o of supervi sors to supervi sed. Such ‘ span of cont r ol ’
m easures are probl em ati c because ma n y   supervi sors spend  onl y  a f r acti on  of  t hei r   wo r k  t i me
m oni t ori ng non-supervi sors and t hei r  incl usi on i n a m easure of m oni t ori ng i nt ensit y m ay
exasperate any bi as r esult i ng f r om  t he simu l t aneous det ermi nat i on of  wa g e s   and supervi sion
[ Kr use  ( 1992)] .
A  good i l l ust r ati on of  t hi s l att er  i ssue i s f ound i n t he study by Leonard ( 1987)  wh i ch
r egresses t he  wa g e s   of  staff   wo r kers across six  occupat i ons  on  t he  supervi sor- t o-staff   r ati o  i n
a sam ple of US h i gh t echnol ogy fi r ms .  Leonard’s result s indi cate a posit i ve,  but  generall y
i nsi gni f i cant,   r elati onshi p bet w een pay and supervi sion and l ead hi m  t o concl ude against   t he
shir ki ng eff i ciency w age m odel .  The absence of corr elati on m ay,  how ever,  r esult  f r om
endogenei t y probl em s relati ng t o a possi bl e subst i t ut i on bet w een supervi sors and staff
wo r kers in t he product i on funct i on.  A ny product i on t echnol ogy exhi bi t i ng a non-zero
ma r gi nal  rate of techni cal subst i t ut i on bet w een supervi sory and non-supervi sory i nput s w il l
i nduce a posi t i ve t r ade-off  bet w een w ages and t he supervi sor- t o-staff  r ati o.
6 On l y i f
supervi sory and st aff  wa g e  r ates vary i ndependent l y,  or if  the supervi sor- t o-staff  rati o i s
exogenousl y det ermi ned,   wi l l   i t   be possibl e t o stati sti call y i dent i f y t he i m pact  of  supervi sion
on  wa g e s   f r om   such a r egression.   I n  Leonard’s analysi s i t   i s l i kel y  t hat   any  t r ade-off   bet w een
supervi sion  and  pay  i s bi ased and  perhaps  dom i nat ed by  such subst i t ut i on  eff ects.
5  The  presence of  wa g e   bargai ni ng  w oul d,   of  course,  abate t hi s probl em .
6  A ssum e,  f or  exam ple,  a Cobb-D ougl as product i on  f unct i on 
b aS AL Q =   wh e r e L  and  S  denot e non-supervi sory
and  supervi sory  i nput s r especti vel y  and  wh e r e Q  denot es out put .   I f   t he f i r m  f aces a com peti t i ve cost  f unct i on C
=w L   +  rS t hen cost  mi ni mi zati on i mp l i es  () () r w L S a b =   such t hat   i ncreases i n w  – t he wa g e   r ate of  non-
supervi sory  wo r kers -   wi l l   r aise t he  supervi sor- t o-staff   r ati o  even i f   supervi sion  has  no  di r ect  eff ect  on  em ployee
ut i l i t y  or  m oni t ori ng.5
An   i ma g i nat i ve  att em pt  t o  cir cum vent  t hi s t ype  of  endogenei t y  probl em  i s undert aken
by G roshen and K rueger (1990) w ho focus on t he supervi sor- t o-staff  rati os for vari ous
r egistered occupat i ons across 300 US  hospi t als.  The  specif i cit y of  t hei r   study i s r ati onal i zed
by Federal r egul ati ons w hi ch render t he supervi sor- t o-staff  r ati o l argel y exogenous.
Consi stent  wi t h  t he  m oni t ori ng  version  of  eff i ciency wa g e   t heory  t hey  f i nd  a str ong  hospi t al-
specif i c eff ect  on  wa g e s   t hat   cuts across occupat i ons  –  i f   a hospi t al  pai d  r elati vel y  hi gh  wa g e s
t o  one  occupat i on  i t   wa s   l i kel y  t o  pay  r elati vel y  hi gh  wa g e s   t o  ot her  occupat i ons  as we l l .   The
i nt er- occupat i onal  pat t ern of the supervi sor- t o-staff  rati o,  how ever,  wa s  mu c h  l ess unif orm.
The w ages of staff  nurses, f or exam ple, we r e negat i vel y corr elated w it h t he ext ent of
supervi sion  wh i ch suggest ed t hat   such wo r kers di d  not   r eceive  com pensati ng  prem ia i n  r eturn
f or closer supervi sion.  The authors concl ude t hat  alt hough t hei r  fi ndi ngs suggest  a w age-
m oni t ori ng t r ade-off ,  they are also consi stent wi t h t he al t ernat i ve expl anati on t hat  hospi t als
wh i ch supervi se t hei r   staff   mo r e closel y  mi ght   prefer  t o  em ploy  l ow -qual i t y/ l ow   pay  wo r kers.
A s i mi l ar focus on a speci f i c indust r y enables R ebit zer (1995) to gi r dl e the om i t t ed
vari able probl em .  He r e t he f ocus i s cont r act  wo r kers i n t he US  pet r ochem ci al  i ndust r y.   Such
wo r kers are answ erable t o t wo   di f f erent  em ployers – t he host   pl ant  and t he cont r actor  -   wh o
t oget her  shape t he  personnel   practi ces governi ng  t hei r   em ploym ent   cont r acts.  C oncerns  about
l egal li abil i t y l i mi t  the degree to w hi ch host  pl ants can int erf ere in t he hum an resource
practi ces of  t he  cont r actors.  As   a r esult ,   esti ma t es of  t he  eff ects of  host   safety  supervi sion  on
t he w ages set  by cont r actors are relati vel y l ess em broi l ed by om i t t ed vari able bias than
esti ma t es deri ved f r om  convent i onal   em ploym ent   r elati onshi ps.   Re bi t zer  f i nds evidence t hat
hi gh l evels of  supervi sion are i ndeed associated wi t h l ow er  wa g e   l evels,  and since t he l i kel y
eff ect of om i t t ed vari able bias is to reduce the observed t r ade-off  bet w een supervi sion and
wa g e s ,   he concl udes t hat   such evidence i s l i kel y t o be a conservat i ve esti ma t e of  t he wa g e -
supervi sion  t r ade-off .
Tw o ot her studi es that  fi nd generall y support i ve evi dence of a w age-supervi sion
t r ade-off  are K rueger (1991) and K ruse (1992).  Kr ueger exam ines pay i n com pany-ow ned
f ast- f ood  out l ets wh e r e m anagers we r e pai d  a f i xed  salary  and  i n  f r anchised out l ets wh e r e t he
ow ner’ s incom e depended on t he out l et’ s perf orm ance. Kr ueger hypot hesi ses that  pay i n6
com pany-ow ned out l ets w oul d be relati vel y hi gh because supervi sion by hi ghl y m ot i vat ed
ow ners i s l ess costl y  t han  supervi sion  by  hi r ed m anagers.  Consi stent  wi t h  t hi s hypot hesi s,  he
f i nds t ot al com pensati on t o be approxi ma t ely 2 (3. 5) per cent hi gher in com pany-ow ned
out l ets.  Kr use i nvest i gat es t he 1980 Sur vey of  Job Cha r acteri sti cs and concl udes t hat   hourl y
wa g e s  i ncrease w it h est abli shm ent size even aft er cont r ol l i ng for personal  characteri sti cs,
occupat i on and i ndust r y.   Mo r eover,   em ployee self - r eport ed supervi sion wa s   f ound t o exhi bi t
a generall y  negat i ve  r elati onshi p  wi t h  wa g e s   -   dai l y  supervi sed wo r kers r eceived  1. 2  per  cent
l ow er  pay  t han  t hei r   w eekly  supervi sed count erpart s ceteris pari bus.
7
St udi es that  fail  to fi nd concl usi ve evi dence of a w age-m oni t ori ng t r ade-off  incl ude
N eal (1993),  Fi t zroy and K raft  (1986) and Brunel l o (1995).  N eal (1993),  usi ng supervi sion
dat a fr om  t he 1977 w ave of the Panel  Sur vey of Incom e,  fi nds t hat  wo r kers in hi gh-wa g e
i ndust r i es are at  l east  as i nt ensivel y supervi sed as l ow -wa g e ,   secondary sector  wo r kers,  and
no evi dence t hat  int er- i ndust r y di f f erences in m oni t ori ng cont r i but e to i nt er- i ndust r y w age
di f f erenti als. Si mi l arl y,  Fi t zroy and K raft  (1986) fi nd t he supervi sor- t o-staff  rati o t o be
i nsi gni f i cantl y related to w ages i n a sam pl e of 65 W est  Ge r ma n  me t al wo r ki ng fi r ms .
Br unel l o ( 1995)  expl ores t he r elati onshi p bet w een pay and bot h t he quant i t y ( proxi ed by t he
supervi sor- t o-staff  rati o) and qual i t y of supervi sion (proxi ed by factors such as the age and
experi ence of  t he supervi sors).   Wi t hout   cont r ol l i ng f or  qual i t y,   a sm all   but   signi f i cant  t r ade-
off   bet w een pay  and  t he  supervi sion  r ati o  i s f ound  f or  bot h  m anual   and  non-m anual   wo r kers.
The i ncl usi on of qual i t y m easures, how ever,  abates the t r ade-off  t o t he ext ent of
i nsi gni f i cance i n  t he  case of  m anual   wo r kers.
Empl oyee shari ng
Empl oyee shari ng has i mp l i cati ons for inst r um ent al and gi f t - exchange m odel s of eff i ciency
wa g e s ,  im pacti ng on bot h t he m argi nal  net  benefi t  of shir ki ng and on t he w i der exchange
envi r onm ent .
8 An  i nt eresti ng,  yet  hi t hert o unexpl ored, quest i on t hus ari ses as to t he
7  I t   shoul d be not ed t hat   Kr use concedes t hat   wh i l st  such f i ndi ngs are generall y consi stent  wi t h eff i ciency wa g e
t heory,  t hey are also com pati bl e w it h t he i dea that  supervi sion i s negat i vel y corr elated w it h ot herwi se
unobserved  hi gher  abil i t y.
8  I ndeed:  ‘ Of f eri ng wo r kers i ncreased i nvol vem ent   i n decision-ma k i ng,   a f i nanci al  stake i n t he perf orm ance of
t he f i r m,   di sclosi ng i nforma t i on about ,   i nt er al i a,   f ut ure i nvest me n t   pl ans and t he f i r m’ s f i nanci al  sit uat i on,   and7
consangui ni t y of pay,  supervi sion and shari ng.  Int r ospect i on w oul d suggest  t hat  shari ng
all eviates t he  need t o  m oni t or.   Wh e t her  i t   augm ent s or  assuages t he  r elati onshi p  bet w een pay
and  supervi sion,   and  t hus  i t s eff ect  on  t he  shape of  t he  t r ade off ,   i s l ess clear.
I n  t erms   of  t he  i nst r um ent al  approach one  mi ght   expect  t he  t r ade-off   t o  be  sharpened  -
an increase in rem unerati on i nduci ng a l arger cut i n m oni t ori ng cet eris pari bus.  The
convent i onaleff i cieny  wa g e   t r ade-off   bet w een pay  and  m oni t ori ng  ari ses because an i ncrease
i n t he f orme r   wi l l   i ncrease t he expected net   benefi t   of  not   shir ki ng -   i f   a wo r ker  chooses t o
shir k he/ she r uns som e r i sk of  bei ng det ected,  f i r ed,  and t hus of  not   r eceivi ng t he extr a pay.
Si nce it  is in t he fi r m’ s int erest to gi ve t he w orker a zero net  benefi t ,  it  can econom i se on
m oni t ori ng and t hus raise the ut i l i t y of shir ki ng by gi vi ng w orkers a bigger chance of
obt aini ng  t he  pay.   I f   a shari ng  schem e r elates,  or  i s perceived  by  wo r kers t o  r elate,  i ndi vi dual
r em unerati on t o i ndi vi dual  eff ort ,  then t he net  benefi t  of shir ki ng i s increased furt her - a
shir ker  f aces t he  com pounded  l oss of  bei ng  det ected and  of  l osi ng  m oney.
I f ,  how ever,  it  is through an exchange of gi f t s that  wa g e s  i nduce eff ort  then t he
sit uat i on i s l ess clear.   A  r i se i n wa g e s   ma y   be r egarded as a gi f t   on t he part   of  t he f i r m  and
t hus m ay i nduce m ore eff ort  and l ess need to m oni t or.  Si mi l arl y,  a shari ng arr angem ent
bet w een t he f i r m  and i t s wo r kforce coul d generate t he sam e f eeli ngs i r r especti ve of  t he l evel
of  r em unerati on.   I f   wa g e s   are i ncreased i n  a shari ng  f i r m  t hen  t he  cruci al  i ssue i s t he  ma r gi nal
ut i l i t y t he wo r kforce deri ves f r om  t hi s gi f t   -   i s i t   mo r e or  l ess t han t hey w oul d have deri ved
had  t hey  r eceived  such wa g e s   i n  a convent i onal   non-shari ng  envi r onm ent ?
On e  mi ght  expect that  any group i ncenti ve schem e advocat i ng equal  profi t  shares
r egardl ess of  i ndi vi dual   perf orm ance wi l l   have l i t t l e eff ect  on t he att i t udes and perf orma n c e
of  i ndi vi dual   wo r kers.  For   exam ple:
A  di l ut i on  or  f r ee r i der  probl em  seem s t o  ari se w henever  i t   i s hard  t o  m oni t or  a singl e person’s
cont r i but i on,   as i s presum ably f r equent l y t he case.  An   external i t y i s present  because any one
person’s rew ard depends on everyone el se’s eff ort .  Wi t h  n  me mb e r s of the group,  the ext r a
profi t   shari ng  r ew ard  associated wi t h  ma r gi nal   eff ort   on  any  singl e wo r ker’ s part   i s di l ut ed by
t he devel opm ent  of com m uni cati on channel s betw een m anagem ent  and w orkers, are all  seen as centr al t o
encouraging  l oyal t y,   mo t i vat i on  and  c o mmi t me n t   and,   t hereby,   t o  r educi ng  t he  need t o  i nvoke  close  m oni t ori ng. ’
[ M cN abb  and  Wh i t f i eld  ( 1998),   p.   174].8
a f actor  of  1/ n.   The  r esult   i s an i neff i cientl y l ow  l evel  of  eff ort ,   wh i ch i s l ow er  as n i s l arger.
[ We i t zm an and  Kr use  ( 1990),   p.   98].
The  probl em  has been i nt erpreted as a ‘ pri soners’  di l e mma ’   wi t h each wo r ker  hol di ng back
eff ort   i n order  t o f r ee r i de of  hi s/her  coll eagues.   A ccepti ng t hi s argum ent ,   one w oul d expect
shari ng  schem es t o  i m pact  negl i gi bl y,   i f   at  all ,   on  l arge  organi sati ons.
9
Di l ut i on aside,   how ever,   t here are ot her  probl em s associated wi t h em ployee shari ng.
Fi r st,   all   schem es t hat   t i e pay t o perf orm ance expose wo r kers t o unw ant ed r i sk.  The  opt i ma l
cont r act  mu s t   now   bal ance t he  cont r adictory  r equi r em ents of  l i nki ng  pay  t o  eff ort   and  l i mi t i ng
r i sk,  and t he opt i ma l   profi t   share i s t ypi call y i nversely r elated t o t he degree of  r i sk aversion
and/ or l evel of uncert aint y,  and posi t i vel y related to t he el asti cit y response of out put  t o
i ncreased eff ort .
10
A nd  f i nal l y,   all   group  i ncenti ve  schem es have  i mp l i cati ons  f or  wo r ker  part i cipat i on  i n
m anagem ent   and  cont r ol .   Requi r i ng  wo r kers t o  bear  mo r e r i sk ma y   open  t he  door  t o  dem ands
f or co-det ermi nat i on.  Wh e t her or not  t hi s is desir able rem ains an open quest i on.  The
‘ propert y ri ght s’ vi ew  is that  profi t  shari ng i s ineff i cient because it  di vert s cont r ol  and
ow nership t ow ards i ndi vi dual i sti call y ori ented w orkers w hose m ot i vat i on i s dil ut ed by fr ee
r i der  i ssues [ Al chian and De ms e t z ( 1972),   Jensen and M eckli ng ( 1979)] .   Par t i cipat i on ma y ,
how ever,   r aise product i vi t y  i f   wo r kers are bet t er  equi pped  t o  mo t i vat e and  m oni t or  each ot her
t han m anagem ent ,  or if  they can provi de t echni cal informa t i on t o m anagem ent  that  w oul d
ot herwi se be t oo costl y or  t i me   consum i ng t o obt ain [ O’ De l l   and Mc Ad a ms   ( 1987),   Ka n t er
( 1987)] .  Si mi l ar benefi t s m ight  i ncl ude t he pot enti al f or i mp r oved channel s of
com m uni cati on,  bet t er confl i ct resolut i on,  a greater wi l l i ngness t o accept new  t echnol ogy,
and  an i ncreased possibi l i t y  of  acqui r i ng  on-t he-j ob  hum an  capit al  f r om   ot her  wo r kers.
11
9  Ther e i s an i m port ant  caveat  t o t hi s argum ent .   I f   t he ‘ gam e’  i s r epeated t hen co-operati on ma y   be sustainabl e.
I nt ui t i vel y,  l ong t erm e mp l oym ent  r elati onshi ps enable co-operati n g  me mb e r s to puni sh thei r  f r ee ri di ng
coll eagues by,  for exam ple, wi t hhol di ng t hei r  ow n eff ort  or ost r acising t he off endi ng ant i - social culpri t s.
Mo r eover,   i t   has  been show n  t hat   an i nsi gni f i cantl y  sm all   am ount   of  co-operati on  i s suff i cient  t o  det er  f r ee r i di ng
[ Fi t zroy  and Kr aft   ( 1986,   1987)] .
10 It  shoul d be not ed, how ever,  that  alt hough ri sk consi derati ons reduce the opt i ma l  profi t  share, a contr act
com pri sing  f i xed  r em unerati on  onl y  i s very  unl i kel y  [ Ha r t   and  Ho l ms t r om   ( 1987)] .
11  To  ascert ain  t he  me r i t   of  such argum ent s Levi ne  and  Tyson  ( 1990)  surveyed  t we n t y-ni ne  em pir i cal  studi es of
wo r ker  part i cipat i on and f ound onl y t wo   concl udi ng against   part i cipat i on.   I n cont r ast,   f ourt een studi es f ound i n
f avour of part i cipat i on w i t h t he rem aini ng t hi r t een off eri ng som ew hat  am biguous result s. Levi ne and Tyson
concl uded t hat  successful  part i cipat i on requi r es: ( i )  som e form o f  profi t  shari ng t o rew ard co-operati ve9
Wh a t ever t he t r ue relati onshi p bet w een em ployee shari ng,  part i cipat i on and
product i vi t y,  thi s study i s hindered by a lack of informa t i on regardi ng t he ext ent of co-
det ermi nat i on wi t hi n t he panel   of  f i r ms .   Thi s i s pot enti all y seri ous:   “.. .   m any studi es i ncl ude
vari ables onl y on fi nanci al part i cipat i on (r eturn ri ght s) or part i cipat i on i n deci sion m aki ng
( cont r ol  ri ght s),  but  not  bot h.  Thi s is extr em ely probl em ati c because .. .  there are str ong
t heoreti cal reasons to bel i eve that  the t wo  r i ght s int eract wi t h each other and do so non-
m onot oni call y.   The  om i t t ed vari able i s severe,  and t he esti ma t es of  t he em ployee ow nership
vari ables t hat   ari se f r om   such studi es ma y   have  t he  wr ong  sign. ” [ Be n- Ne r   and  Jones  ( 1995),
p.   551].
Som ewhat  surpri singl y t here has been relati vel y l i t t l e contem porary research int o
t hese  i ssues.  Sever al  r esearchers have  f ocused  on  t he  extr em e case of  em ployee-ow ned  f i r ms
and co-operati ves [see, for exam ple, Gr eenberg (1986),  Ba r t l ett  et al  (1992)]  but  to our
know l edge  no  one  has  expl ored t he  sit uat i on  wi t hi n  profi t   shari ng  f i r ms .
III. T heoreti cal  U nderpinni ng
Som e  i nsi ght   i nt o  t he  possibl e r elati onshi p  bet w een em ployee shari ng  and  supervi sion  ma y   be
di scerned fr om  t he fol l ow i ng exposi t ory m odel .  A ssum e that  wo r kers are hom ogenous ri sk
neut r al wi t h ut i l i t y funct i ons of the form e m u − = .m r epresents incom e and e represents
eff ort .  Empl oyed w orkers m ake a di screte all  or not hi ng choi ce as regards t he provi sion of
eff ort   t o t hei r   em ployer  such t hat   () e e, 0 = , 0 > e .   The  f i r m  has access t o som e m oni t ori ng
t echnol ogy  defi ned  t hough  t he  f unct i on  () k p  wh e r e k denot es t he  val ue  of  r esources devot ed
t o  m oni t ori ng  and  () k p  t he  probabi l i t y  t hat   a shir ker  wi l l   be  det ected.
12  We   assum e  () 0 > ′ k p
behavi our;   ( i i )   guaranteed l ong t erm  em ploym ent   t o i ncrease t he t i me   hori zons of  wo r kers and so r ender  t hem
mo r e adaptable to change,  (i i i )  relati vel y narr ow  w age di f f erenti als to prom ot e group cohesi veness;  and (i v)
guaranteed wo r ker  r i ght s -   f or  exam ple di sm issal  onl y  f or  j ust   cause.
12 To avoi d unnecessary com pl i cati ons w e assum e t hat  t he cri t eri a on w hi ch thi s judgem ent  i s based are
veri f i able by  an i ndependent   arbi t r ator  such t hat   t here i s no  di sput e about   t he  f i r m’ s assessm ent.10





13 De t ecti on i mp l i es inst antaneous di sm issal and
unem pl oym ent   ut i l i t y  b.
14
Fi xed W ages
Consi der  f i r st  t he f i xed wa g e   scenari o.   The  f i r m’ s probl em  i s t o ma x i mi se profi t s subj ect  t o
t he  const r aint s t hat   t he  wo r ker  r eceives  at  l east  hi s/her  r eservat i on  ut i l i t y  ( viz. e b+ )   and  t hat ,
once em ployed,  he/ she does not  shir k.  Thi s latt er necessit ates the w orker bei ng pai d t he
l ow est   wa g e   t hat   sati sfi es t he  ‘ non-shir ki ng  const r aint ’   ( NSC) :
() () [] w k p b k p e w − + ≥ − 1( 1)
Sat i sfacti on  of  ( 2)  i mp l i es an opt i ma l   ( viz.  ‘ eff i ciency’)   wa g e   of:
()
() k p





such that  wo r kers receive som e em pl oym ent  rents but  are just  indi f f erent bet w een shir ki ng













Fi xed W ages  wi t h  Rem unerat i ve Shi rking  Cos t s
Consi der  now   a mo r e general  case i n  wh i ch t he  i ndi vi dual ’ s wa g e   i s som e f unct i on  of  hi s/her
perf orm ance such that  there is som e rem unerati ve penal t y associated w it h shi r ki ng.  To be
sure,  assum e t hat   t he shir ki ng wa g e   i s gi ven by  () z w w − = 1  wh e r e  () 1 , 0 ∈ z i s a param eter
denot i ng t he rem unerati ve cost  associated w it h shi r ki ng.  If  z = 0 then w e return t o t he
standard fi xed w age case as above.  As  z  i ncreases the i ndi vi dual  suff ers an increasing
f i nanci al  penal t y f r om  shir ki ng and i n t he l i mi t   l oses all   hi s/her  wa g e   as z approaches uni t y.
Thenon  shir ki ng  const r aint   i s now :
13    I t   i s t hus  t echni call y  possibl e f or  t he  f i r m  t o  perf ectl y  m oni t or  wo r ker  perf orm ance.  Si nce our  f ocus  of  i nt erest
i s not   t he  opt i ma l   l evel  of  m oni t ori ng  we   assum e t hat   product i on  and  m oni t ori ng  t echnol ogi es are such t hat   i t   i s
alwa y s   i n  t he  i nt erests of  t he  f i r m  t o  m oni t or  i mp e r f ectl y.
14 Al l ow i ng t echni call y di sm issed shir kers som e chance of re-em ploym ent  w oul d not  change the qual i t ati ve
aspects of  our  concl usi ons.11
() () [] () z w k p b k p e w − − + ≥ − 1 1( 4)
Sat i sfacti on  of  wh i ch i mp l i es an eff i ciency wa g e   of:
( )
() ( ) z z k p







The  nat ure of  t he z param eter  i s cruci al  t o t he shape of  t he wa g e - m oni t ori ng t r ade off .   The
t wo   l i mi t i ng  cases are:
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() k p







0 l i m ( 6)




1 l i m ( 7)
Asz   t ends t o zero t here i s no r em unerati ve cost  associated wi t h shir ki ng and we   deri ve t he
eff i ciency w age defi ned i n equat i on (2) above.  As  z  t ends t o uni t y t he rem unerati ve cost
associated w it h shi r ki ng i s absolut e and the eff i ciency w age is consequent l y reduced.




















0 , 0 l i mw





0 , 1 l i m ( 11)
Thus i r r especti ve of the rem unerati ve cost  associated w it h shi r ki ng t he fi r m  can hold t he
wo r ker  dow n  t o  hi s/her  r eservat i on  wa g e   provi di ng  i t   perf ectl y  m oni t ors.
The  wa g e - m oni t ori ng  t r ade-off   i s gi ven  by:
() ( ) []
() ( ) [] e z bz k p










wi t h  l i mi t s:12
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→ b k p dw
dk
z ( 14)
The t r ade-off  depends cruci all y on t he val ue of z. Wi t h no rem unerati ve shi r ki ng cost s w e
deri ve  t he  convent i onal   i nverse r elati onshi p.   Wi t h  com plete costs t he  t r ade off   i s posi t i ve,   t he
expected ut i l i t y  of  shir ki ng  i ncreasing  wi t h  t he  l evel  of  wi t h  m oni t ori ng  since i t   i s now   i n  t he
wo r ker’ s i nt erest  t o be det ected and f i r ed since onl y t hen wi l l   any r em unerati on be r eceived.




z e z bz
+
= → = − −
* * * 0 1 ( 15)
Thus t he t r ade off  is negat i ve (posi t i ve) for val ues of z less than (greater than) z
*.  The key
poi nt   i s i l l ust r ated i n  Fi gure I   bel ow .
k
w 0





Fi gure I:  W age-Mo n i t ori ng  Tr ade   Of f s
W ages,   M oni t ori ng  and  Shari ng
W e now  devel op a som ew hat mo r e forma l  m odel  of em ployee shari ng.  W e assum e for
simp l i cit y t hat   f i r ms   em ploy a singl e wo r ker  and f ace a stochast i c r evenue f unct i on  () i e f q ;
wh e r e i q   i s a param eter  r epresenti ng  a r andom   shock  t o  dem and  or  product i vi t y.   We   assum e
t hat i q   t akes one of  t wo   val ues,   H q wi t h probabi l i t y s or  L q   wi t h probabi l i t y () s − 1. i q i s13
r evealed t o bot h t he wo r ker  and t he f i r m  aft er  t he em ploym ent   contr act  has been signed and
i m pacts on  r evenue as f ol l ow s:
() ()()() L H L H f f e f e f q q q q , 0 , 0 , , > = > ( 17)
We   envi sage a simp l e em ployee shari ng  cont r act  of  t he  f orm:
() () i e f w w q l l ; 1 + − = ( 18)
wh e r ew  r epresents t ot al  r em unerati on,  w  t he  com ponent   of  t ot al  r em unerati on  t hat   i s ‘ f i xed’
( i . e.  i ndependent   of  wo r ker  perf orm ance),   and  [] 1 , 0 ∈ j l   t he l evel  of  wo r ker  equit y ( vis.  t he
f r acti on  of  t ot al  r em unerati on  t hat   depends  on  i ndi vi dual   eff ort ) .
15
The  NSC  now   t akes t he  f orm:
( ) () [ ] () ( ) () [ ]
() () [] () () [] () () () [] {} L j j H j j
L j j H j
f w s f w s k p b k p
e e f w s e f w s
q l l q l l
q l l q l l
, 0 1 1 , 0 1 1
, 1 1 , 1
+ − − + + − − +
≥
− + − − + + −
( 19)
I t   i s apparent  f r om  t he above t hat   t he probabi l i t y of  det ecti on i s gi ven by t he probabi l i t y t hat
t he fi r m mo n i t ors plus t he probabi l i t y t hat  i t  does not  m oni t or but  t hat  t he w orker i s
‘ unl ucky’,vi z. () ( ) () [] k p s k p − − + 1 1.   We   can t herefore r educe equat i on  ( 17)  t o:
( ) () ( ) () [] () ( ) ( ) [ ] H j j L H j j f w s b s e e f s e sf w q l l q q l l , 0 1 ~ ~ 1 , 1 , 1 + − + − ≥ − − + + − ( 20)
wh e r e () [] k p s s − = 1 ~ .   Sol vi ng  f or  t he  base  wa g e   yi elds:
() () () () ( ) [] {} ( ) [] L H j
j
e f k p s e sf e b s
s
w q q l
l
, 1 2 , ~ 1 ~ 1 1
1
− − − − + −
− −
= ( 21)
and  i mp l i es t ot al  ‘ eff i ciency’  r em unerati on  of:
() () f s s e
s




1 * l ( 22)
15  We   assum e i n wh a t   f ol l ow s t hat   t he extent  of  wo r ker  equi t y,   as m easured by l ,   i s exogenous bei ng f i xed by
custom   or  governm ent   di r ecti ve.   Thi s i s obvi ousl y  a simp l i sti c assum pti on  and  a f ul l er  exposi t i on  w oul d  seek t o
expl ain  t he  di str i but i on  of  di f f erent  cont r actual   arr angem ent s.14
wh e r e () () L H e f e f f q q ; ; − = ∆ .  Tot all y di f f erenti ati ng t hi s expression yi elds t he t r ade-off s
bet w een pay,   supervi sion  and  shari ng:
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j j l l
( 25)
Equat i on  ( 25)  i s unequi vocall y  negat i ve.   The  sign  of  equat i ons  ( 23)  and  ( 24)  depend  cruci all y
on t he t erm  ( ) e f s j − ∆ l .   I f   ( ) s e f j l ≤ ∆ ∆   t hen equat i ons ( 23)  and ( 24)  are negat i ve such t hat
profi t   shari ng  f i r ms   f ace t he  sam e i nverse t r ade-off   but   m oni t or  r elati vel y  l ess t han  t hei r   non-
profi t  shari ng count erpart s.
16 I f   ( ) s e f j l > ∆ ∆  t hen equat i ons (23) and (24) are posi t i ve
i mp l yi ng t hat   profi t   shari ng f i r ms   m oni t or  r elati vel y mo r e and f ace an upw ard slopi ng t r ade
off .
U nder  t hese assum pti ons,   e f s = ∆   such t hat  e f s j < ∆ l   and equat i ons ( 23)  -   ( 25)  are
all  negat i ve i mp l yi ng t hat :  (a) shari ng fi r m s devot e relati vel y l ess resources to m oni t ori ng
t han  t hei r   non-shari ng  count erpart s;  ( b)  l i ke  t hei r   non-shari ng  count erpart s,  shari ng  f i r ms   also
f ace a tr ade-off  bet w een tot al rem unerati on and m oni t ori ng;  and (c) the t r ade-off  bet w een
t ot al  r em unerati on  and  m oni t ori ng  i s hei ght ened am ongst   shari ng  f i r ms   –  an i ncrease i n  t ot al
r em unerati on i nduces a r elati vel y l arger  decli ne i n mo n i t ori ng am ongst   shari ng f i r ms   ceteris
pari bus.





() 0 1 l l p >
Fi gure II:  Op t i ma l   Pay-Mo n i t ori ng  Tr ade   Of f s:  0 < dw dk
The  l att er  i s i l l ust r ated graphi call y  i n  Fi gure I   above.   The  t wo   curves  r epresent  i so-profi t   l i nes
i n  ( w,k )   space.  An   i ncrease i n  t he  shari ng  coeff i cient  sharpens  t he  t r ade off   bet w een pay  and
m oni t ori ng.Int ui t i vel y,   r aising  pay  wi t hi n  a shari ng  f i r m  wi l l   i nduce  a r elati vel y  l arger  cut  i n
m oni t ori ng expendi t ure: (i )  the l ess sensit i ve i s the m oni t ori ng funct i on - i. e. the sm al l er is
t he f all   i n t he probabi l i t y of  det ecti on brought   about   by t he r educt i on i n m oni t ori ng;   ( i i )   t he
l arger is the l evel of eff ort  requi r ed by t he fi r m;  and (i i i )  the l arger is the pot enti al loss to
shir ki ng t hat  is independent  of the fi r m’ s abil i t y t o m oni t or vis. f ∆ l  - that  is the share of
profi t s gi ven over  t o wo r kers mu l t i pl i ed by t he r educt i on i n profi t s i nduced by t he wo r ker’ s
decision  t o  shir k.   Thi s wi l l   be  zero  f or  non-shari ng  f i r ms .   Wi t hi n  a l arge  shari ng  envi r onm ent
i t   coul d be zero – t he second t erm  of  t he product   i n part i cular  i s l i kel y t o be negl i gi bl e.  I t   i s
very  unl i kel y,   how ever,   t o  be  posi t i ve  and  i f   t he  shari ng  arr angem ent s are ma d e   over  sm all er
sub-di vi sions  t hen  our  predicti ons  w oul d  hol d.
17
These predicti ons are, how ever,  deri ved fr om  a st yl i sed inst rum ental  exposi t i on of
eff i ciency w ages. Mo r e generall y,  we  wo u l d expect  eff i ciency w ages to operate in bot h an
i nst r um ent al  and gi f t   exchange capacit y,   and i t   r em ains open t o quest i on as t o how  wo r kers
mi ght  i nt erpret such gif t s w it hi n a shari ng envi r onm ent .  Do  t hey confer i ncreasing or
17  No t e t hat   t he l evel  of  m oni t ori ng expendi t ure wi l l   also det ermi ne t he shape of  t he t r ade-off   dependi ng upon
t he  l i neari t y  or  ot herwi se of  t he  avail able m oni t ori ng  t echnol ogy.16
di mi ni shing ma r gi nal   ut i l i t y? I f   em ployee shari ng i s i nt erpreted f avourably by wo r kers,  does
t he  addi t i onal   gi f t   of  supra-com peti t i ve  wa g e s   eli cit   r elati vel y  mo r e or  l ess eff ort   i n  a shari ng
or a non-shari ng fi r m ? The sociol ogi cal basi s of gi f t s renders such issues vir t ual l y
i m penetr able to t heoreti cal exposi t i on and i t  is thus t o our em pir i cal evidence t hat  we  a r e
obl i ged  t o  t urn.
IV . D ata  and  Me t hodol ogy
Da t a
Ou r  dat a are deri ved fr om  t he Equi pe de Recherche sur les M arches, l ’ Empl oi  et l a
Si mu l at i on  ( ERM ES)   dat abase over  t he  peri od  1981-1991.
18  The  dat abase wa s   const r uct ed t o
i mp r ove understandi ng of the French labour ma r ket  and cont ains a fi r m l evel survey of a
sam ple of Fr ench-based fi r ms  wh i ch em ploy m ore than 300 em pl oyees. Ther e w ere 1002
such f i r ms   i n  existence i n  1983  wh e n   t he  dat abase wa s   set  up,   500  of  wh i ch we r e surveyed  by
post   and 230 of  wh i ch provi ded i nforma t i on.
19  The  survey i ncl udes quest i ons r elati ng t o t he
em ploym ent  practi ces adopt ed by t he fi r m a s  we l l  as fi r m  characteri sti cs such as indust r i al
aff i l i ati on.  The i ndust r i es covered w ere Engi neeri ng and Capi t al G oods (Eng/ Ca p) ;
Ag r i cult ure (Ag r i c);  Ener gy;  Int erme d i ate G oods (I nt  Gd s ) ;  Mo t or Ve h i cles (Mt r  Ve h ) ;
Tel ecom m unicati ons  ( Tel ecom ),   Tr ansport   ( Tr ansp)  and  Ser vi ces.
20
We  s e l ected com panies fr om  t he dat abase accordi ng t o t he fol l ow i ng cri t eri a. Fi r st,
onl y t hose com panies provi di ng i nforma t i on on a num ber of key vari ables such as the
com pany’s ‘ Si r ene’  ( i . e.  r egistr ati on code)  and t he t ot al  wa g e   bi l l   we r e selected.  Ou r   i ni t i al
18  ERM ES  i s a l abour  ma r ket   r esearch group  based  i n  Par i s I I   Un i versit y  and  i s aff i l i ated t o  t he  Na t i onal   Ce nt r e
of  Sci enti f i c R esearch ( CNRS) .
19  The  survey i s deri ved f r om  t he ‘ social  account s’  t hat   all   f i r ms   em ployi ng mo r e t han 300 wo r kers are l egall y
obl i ged t o f urni sh.  Each annual   sw eep cont ains account i ng i nforma t i on on t he curr ent  and t wo   preceding years.
Thus,   alt hough  t he  dat abase wa s   set  up  i n  1983,   we   have  dat a f r om   1981.
20 Shar i ng arr angem ent s in France are relati vel y recent phenom ena,  wi t h profi t  shari ng and em pl oyee share
ow nership  pl ans onl y  r eceivi ng  off i cial  r ecognit i on  i n  1959  and 1970  r especti vel y.   They  have,   how ever,   proven
t o be ext r em ely popul ar.  By 1986 (1990) over 0. 6 (2. 0) mi l l i on w orkers w ere covered by a profi t  shari ng
arr angem ent .   ESOP’ s have  been mo r e popul ar  am ongst   l arger  f i r ms   wi t h  350  f i r ms   havi ng  such arr angem ent s i n
pl ace coveri ng  0. 6  mi l l i on  peopl e by  1989  [ see Uv a l i c ( 1991),   DARES  ( 1995)] .   Ext ensive  det ail s of  t he  ERM ES
dat abase are cont ained  i n  Ba l l ot   and  Fakhfakh  ( 1996)  and  d’Ar cimo l   ( 1995).17
sam ple t hus com pri sed 195 com panies,  76 of  wh i ch appeared f or  t he w hol e t en year  peri od,
t hereby  f ormi ng  an unbal anced panel   of  dat a.
We  e s t i ma t ed eight  regression speci f i cati ons focusi ng on t he fol l ow i ng fi ve sub-
sam ples:  ( 1)  all   f i r ms   [ specif i cati ons  ( i )   –  ( i i i ) ] ;   ( 2)  shari ng  f i r ms   [ specif i cati on  ( i v)] ;   ( 3)  non-
shari ng-f i r ms   [ specif i cati on  ( v)] ;   ( 4)  profi t   shari ng  onl y f i r ms   [ specif i cati ons  ( vi )   –  ( vi i ) ] ;   and
( 5)  ESOP  onl y f i r ms   [ specif i cati on ( vi i i ) ] .   Ha v i ng selected t he appropri ate sub-sam ple f r om
t he 195 com pani es for each specif i cati on,  we  t hen el i mi nat ed: ( i )  any com pany w hi ch
appeared in t he dat abase for less than t hree years in t ot al;  and (i i )  any ‘appearance’ by a
com pany of  l ess t han t hree years occurr i ng i mme d i ately before or  aft er  a ‘ di sappearance’  of
mo r e than t w o years. Ou r  aim h e r e w as to exclude l engt hy di sappearances duri ng w hi ch
com panies ma y   experi ence unobservabl e,  and  t hus  pot enti all y  mi sleading,   changes.
The num ber of fi r ms  i nt r oduci ng and abol i shing shari ng schem es and t he sectoral
di str i but i on of  shari ng and non-shari ng f i r ms   across t he panel   are set  out   i n Tabl es I   and I I
f ol l ow i ng.
Tabl e I
Tabl e II
I t  is apparent fr om  Tabl es I and II  that  the sectoral di str i but i on of com panies rem ained
r elati vel y  stable over  t he  sam ple peri od  wi t h  t he  ma j ori t y  of  com panies t hat   we r e eli mi nat ed,
wh e t her  t em porall y  or  perm anent l y,   bei ng  generall y  t hose  wh i ch had  not   suppl i ed i nforma t i on
f or t he pre-1983 peri od.  Thi s deri ves fr om  t he fact t hat  t he dat abase only becam e ful l y
operati onal   i n  1984  and  no  m eans of  veri f i cati on  we r e avail able f or  t he  preceding  years.
21
Me t hodol ogy
Ou r   esti ma t i ng  equat i on  i s specif i ed as f ol l ow s:
21 It  is apparent fr om  Tabl e II  that  there has been a three-f ol d i ncrease in t he proport i on of sam pled fi r ms
operati ng som e form o f  em ployee shari ng arr angem ent .  Thi s is not  specif i c to our sam ple, but  rather accords
wi t h general tr ends i n t he grow t h of such schem es in France over the 1980s,  especiall y fol l ow i ng t he 1986
Mi ni str y  of  Labour  Or di nance  abol i shing  t he  r equi r em ent  of  f i r ms   t o  obt ain  pri or  mi ni steri al  approval   before t he
i mp l em entati on  of  any  profi t   shari ng  schem e.  By  t he  end  of  1985  ( 1990),   1300  ( 10000)  profi t   shari ng  cont r acts
had  been signed  coveri ng  0. 4  ( 2. 0)  mi l l i on  em ployees [ see Fakhf akh and Ma b i l e ( 1997)] .18
i i i i i t i t i t i t u Z W m + + = b a ( 14)
wh e r e N i, . . . , 1 =   denot es t he f i r m  specif i c subscri pt ,   N  denot es t he t ot al  num ber  of  f i r ms   i n
t he panel  and  i i i T t, . . . , 1 =  denot es the fi r m  specif i c ti m e subscri pt  r epresenti ng t he t t h
appearance by f i r m  i   i n t he panel .
22  The  err or  str uct ure all ow s f or  f i r m  specif i c eff ects wi t h
i i i t i i t v u + = m ,  wh e r e  i m  and 
i i t v a r e ii d, ( )
2 , 0 m s m N i→  and  ( )
2 , 0 v i t N v
i s → .  Fi nal l y,  
i i t m
r epresents the ‘m oni t ori ng i nt ensit y’ of fi r m i  wh i l st 
i i t W  and 
i i t Z r epresent vectors of
com pensati on  and  f i r m  envi r onm ent   characteri sti cs r especti vel y.
Fol l ow i ng Leonard (1987),  Go r don (1990,  1994) and N eal ( 1993),  we  p r oxy
m oni t ori ng i nt ensit y vi a t he rati o of supervi sory t o non-supervi sory em pl oyees. Dr ago and
Per l ma n  ( 1989) support  the use of supervi sion as a proxy for m oni t ori ng,  alt hough t hey
acknow l edge t hat   supervi sion ma y   occur  f or  non-m oni t ori ng purposes -   f or  exam ple,  t o co-
ordi nat e product i on.  Indeed, m oni t ori ng m ay not  entail  di r ect supervi sion but  ma y  i nst ead
r ely  on  f actors such as out put   m easurem ent  and  pi ece r ates.  Mo r e probl em ati c,  t he  num ber  of
supervi sors mi ght   be hi gh because m oni t ori ng i s di f f i cult   [ Al l gul i n and El l i ngsen ( 1998)]   or
t hat  supervi sors onl y spend a fr acti on of wo r k t i me  mo n i t ori ng [Re bi t zer (1995)] .  De s p i t e
t hese probl em s,  t he r elati ve pauci t y of  dat a com pels us – l i ke so m any ot her  r esearchers -   t o
r ely  on  t he  proxy  defi ned  above.
23
We  i ncorporate a num ber of vari ables int o our analysi s to cont r ol  for com pensati on
and envi r onm ent al f actors w it hi n t he fi r m.  I n part i cular,  and gi ven our obj ecti ve of
i nvest i gat i ng t he relati onshi p bet w een supervi sion,  pay and em pl oyee shari ng,  we  f ol l ow
Bl asi  ( 1988)  i n  cont r ol l i ng  f or  t he  extent  of  t he  l att er  by  i ncl udi ng  d u mmy   vari ables denot i ng
t he presence of  a part i cular  shari ng schem e and a vari able denot i ng t he r ati o of  t he average
profi t  shari ng bonus t o t he average base salary per fi r m ( BONUS%) .  Ou r  dat a do not ,
unfort unat ely,  di scri mi nat e betw een the num ber of wo r kers covered by a profi t  shari ng or
22  I t   shoul d  be  not ed t hat   t he  peri ods  of  observat i on  are not   necessari l y  t he  sam e f or  all   com panies.  Si mi l arl y,   t he
f i r st  and l ast  peri od of  eli gi bi l i t y of  a com pany t o t he sam ple i s not   necessari l y t he f i r st  year  ( i . e.  1981)  or  t he
l ast  year  ( i . e.  1991).
23  On e   excepti on i s Kr use ( 1992)  w ho proxi es m oni t ori ng by an em ployee r eport ed m easure of  how  oft en t he
supervi sor  checks hi s/her  wo r k.19
ESOP s cheme,  nor t he percentage of stock w hi ch is em ployee ow ned.
24 Ful l  vari able
defi ni t i ons  and  s u mma r y  stati sti cs f or  t he  expl anatory  vari ables are det ail ed i n  Tabl es I I I   and
I V  bel ow .
Tabl e III
Tabl e IV
Som ewhat  surpri singl y t here is no signi f i cant di f f erence in t he average rates of supervi sion
across shari ng and non-shari ng fi r ms .  It  is m isleading,  how ever,  to read too m uch i nt o t hi s
since t here are signi f i cant  di f f erences across t he  t wo   t ypes  of  f i r ms   wh i ch ma y   t hem sel ves  be
corr elated wi t h em ployee shari ng and/ or  supervi sion.   To  cont r ol   f or  such f actors we   t urn t o
our  econom et r i c analysi s.
V. Re s ul t s
Ou r   econom et r i c analysi s i s r endered som ew hat  probl em ati c by t he unbal anced nat ure of  t he
panel .   Nu me r ous  approaches have  been proposed  t o  t ake account   of  t he  i ncom pl ete nat ure of
sam ple groups [see H siao (1989),  Ve r beek and N ij ma n  ( 1992) and W ansbeek and K apt eyn
( 1989)  f or  surveys of  t hi s area].   I t   i s appropri ate t o use t he f i xed eff ects esti ma t or  gi ven t hat
t he H ausm an Chi  squared stati sti c indi cates signi f i cant corr elati on bet w een the i ndi vi dual
eff ects and t he expl anatory vari ables. In addi t i on,  it  is apparent that  a pot enti al issue of
endogenei t y ma y   exist  wi t h r espect  t o wa g e s   and,   hence,   i n t he em pir i cal  specif i cati ons t hat
f ol l ow   we   adopt   t he  H ausm an  and  Tayl or  i nst r um ent s f or  bot h  base  and  t ot al  wa g e s .
25
Ou r  result s are presented in Tabl e s  V –  VI I  fol l ow i ng.  A s out l i ned previousl y,  we
present eight  specif i cati ons,  all  of wh i ch appear to be generall y w el l  defi ned.  In part i cular,
assum ing t he underl yi ng econom et r i c m odel  is corr ectl y specif i ed, the si gni f i cance of the
24 Al t hough oft en confused,  profi t  shari ng and ESO P’s are, at least in pri nci pl e, qui t e disti nct .  The l att er pay
benefi t s in com pany st ock rather than i n cash and t he com pany’s cont r i but i on need not  be t i ed to profi t s. In
practi ce, how ever,  deferr ed profi t  shari ng pl ans are de rigour and t hese are m uch m ore akin t o ESO P’s,
especiall y  wh e n   t he  deferr ed com pensati on  i s hel d  i n  com pany stock  [ Bl asi  ( 1988)] .   Ne v e r t hel ess,  t he  argum ent
t hat   t yi ng t he f ort unes of  capit al  and l abour  t oget her  mi ght   i m pact  f avourably upon f i r m  perf orm ance has been
appl i ed t o  bot h  schem es [ Cont e and  Svej nar  ( 1988)] .
25  That   i s,  all   t he vari ables i n Tabl e V,   except  t he em ployee shari ng vari ables,  t aken i n m eans and i n devi ati on
f r om   m ean [ see Ha u s ma n   and Tayl or  ( 1981)] .20
H ausm an Chi - squared stati sti c confi r m s our use of t he fi xed eff ects approach w it h t he
excepti on  of  specif i cati on  ( vi i i ) ,   Tabl e VI I   ( see f oot not e 26  bel ow ).
Al l   Fi rm s
I t  is apparent fr om  Tabl e V  that  for the ‘all  fi r m’  sam ple, our result s support  the st andard
t r ade-off  bet w een w ages and m oni t ori ng.  In t erms  o f  em ployee shari ng (specif i cati on i i ) ,  it
w oul d seem  that  it  is the presence of an E SO P rather than a profi t  shari ng schem e w hi ch
assert s a signi f i cant  negat i ve eff ect  on m oni t ori ng.   I ndeed,  wh e n   we   spli t   t ot al  r em unerati on
i nt o  a base  and  shari ng  com ponent   ( specif i cati on  i i i ) ,   t he  l att er  i s seen t o  exert   no  signi f i cant
eff ect  on  m oni t ori ng.
26
Tabl e V
We  i ncorporate em ploym ent  as a proxy for fi r m s i ze, di f f erences in w hi ch m ay induce
di f f erences i n m oni t ori ng wi t h t urnover  and adverse selecti on costs encouraging l arger  f i r ms
t o pay hi gher wa g e s  [ Br unel l o (1995),  Kr use (1992),  Bul ow  and Sum m ers (1986)] .  The
posi t i ve and hi ghl y signi f i cant  esti ma t ed coeff i cient  on em ploym ent   support s t he hypot hesi s
t hat   l arge  f i r ms   do  i ndeed devot e mo r e r esources t o  m oni t ori ng.
Expendi t ure on t r aini ng al so appears to exert  a posi t i ve i nfl uence on m oni t ori ng.  It
mi ght  be t he case that  fi r ms  i nvest i ng heavi l y i n t r aini ng are m ore incl i ned t o m oni t or in
order  t o ensure r eturns f r om  t he expansi on of  hum an capit al.   I n all   t hree specif i cati ons,   our
r esult s suggest   t hat   t urnover  exert s a negat i ve i nfl uence on m oni t ori ng.   On e   expl anati on f or
t hi s mi ght   be  t hat   as t ot al  exit s r i se t hose  i ndi vi dual s i l l   suit ed t o  t he  t ask i n  hand  ma y   l eave,
t hereby  all eviati ng  t he  need t o  m oni t or.   I t   i s also i nt eresti ng  t o  not e t hat   f i r ms   wi t h  r elati vel y
hi gh proport i ons of fem ale, young,  part - t i m e and ol d em pl oyees expend si gni f i cantl y few er
r esources on m oni t ori ng.  Gi ven t he l i mi t ed em ploym ent  opport uni t i es avail able to t he fi r st
t hree of  t hese  groups,   t he  t hreat  of  unem pl oym ent   alone  ma y   be  suff i cient  t o  eli cit   eff ort .   The
decli ne i n m oni t ori ng am ongst  fi r ms  e mp l oyi ng a hi gh proport i on of ‘ol d’ wo r kers m ight
26  We   are i mp l i cit l y  r ecordi ng  a zero  bonus  f or  non  profi t   shari ng  f i r ms   i n  specif i cati on  ( i i i ) .21
r efl ect t he reluct ance of such w orkers to j eopardi se losi ng t he returns t o t hei r  l ong-
accum ulated hum an  capit al  i nvest me n t s.
Fi nal l y,   our  r esult s i ndi cate t hat   despi t e bei ng r ecorded as separate groups,   t here i s a
very  str ong  corr elati on  bet w een t he  percentage of  m anageri al  staff   and  t he  supervi sor- t o-staff
r ati o.   I ndeed,  t hi s corr elati on  wi l l   be  seen t o  hol d  i n  every  one  of  our  eight   specif i cati ons.
Shari ng  and  Non-Shari ng  Fi rm s
Tur ni ng  t o  t he  di chot om y  bet w een ‘ shari ng’  and  ‘ non-shari ng’  f i r ms ,   t he  r esult s presented i n
Tabl e VI   suggest   t hat   t he  i nfl uence  of  t ot al   pay  on  m oni t ori ng  i s l ess pronounced  i n  ‘ shari ng’
t han  ‘ non-shari ng’  f i r ms .   Thi s contr adicts our  a  pri ori   expectati ons  and  w oul d  seem  count er-
i nt ui t i ve i n t erms  o f  an inst r um ent al eff i ciency w age sett i ng.  It  coul d,  how ever,  represent a
di mi ni shing ma r gi nal   ut i l i t y of  ‘ gi f t s’  on t he part   of  wo r kers – i . e.  wo r kers i n shari ng f i r ms
obt ain relati vel y l ess addit i onal  ut i l i t y fr om  hi gh pay,  and subsequent l y requi r e relati vel y
hi gher  supervi sion,   t han  t hei r   count erpart s i n  non-shari ng  f i r ms .
Tabl e VI
Ot her  r esult s of  i nt erest  i ncl ude  t he  proport i on  of  f oreign  wo r kers,  wh i ch i s posi t i vel y  r elated
t o m oni t ori ng w i t hi n non-shari ng,  but  not  shari ng,  fi r ms ,  and t he fi r m s i ze eff ect,  wh i ch is
i nsi gni f i cant in shari ng fi r ms  y e t  signi f i cant and posi t i ve i n non-shari ng fi r ms .  Som ewhat
surpri sing,   t he r ate of  staff   t urnover  i s posi t i vel y r elated t o mo n i t ori ng i n shari ng f i r ms ,   but
negat i vel y so related in non-shari ng fi r ms .  Fi nal l y,  as per the ‘all  fi r m’  sam ple, tr aini ng
expendi t ure i s posi t i vel y  associated wi t h  m oni t ori ng  i n  bot h  t ypes  of  establi shm ent.
Pr of i t   Shari ng  and  ESOP  Fi rm s
Gi ven t he signi f i cant  di f f erences bet w een profi t   shari ng and ESOP  schem es,  we   di sti ngui sh
bet w een t he  t ype  of  shari ng  arr angem ent s i n  Tabl e VI I .   I n  all   t hree specif i cati ons  t he  t r ade-off
bet w een supervi sion and pay prevail s, alt hough t he m agni t ude of t hi s relati onshi p i s
som ew hat assuaged w it hi n profi t  shari ng fi r ms .  In specif i cati on (vi i ) ,  the bonus vari able
exhi bi t s a posi t i ve  coeff i cient,   wh i ch wo u l d  appear  t o  contr adict  our  a  pri ori   expectati ons.   I t
coul d be t hat  the i ncenti ve t o fr ee ri de overr i des any consi derati ons of gi f t s and com pels22
profi t  shari ng fi r ms  t o i nvest  relati vel y m ore heavil y i n m oni t ori ng w orker perf orm ance.
Al t ernat i vel y,   i t   ma y   be  t hat   supervi sors are t he  ma i n  r ecipi ents of  such bonuses.
Tabl e VI I
Ot her  r esult s of  i nt erest  r efl ect  t he a s y mme t r i es bet w een t he t wo   f i r m  t ypes,   specif i call y t he
proport i on of part - t i me  e mp l oyees is posi t i vel y (negat i vel y) related to m oni t ori ng i n ESO P
( profi t - shari ng fi r ms )  wh i l st turnover is posi t i vel y (negat i vel y) so related in profi t - shari ng
( ESOP)   f i r ms .
To  s u mma r i se, our result s suggest  that  the relati onshi p bet w een rem unerati on and
supervi sion  depends  cruci all y  on  wh e t her  f i r ms   have  a stake i n  t he  perf orm ance of  t hei r   f i r m.
To be specif i c, the exi stence of em ployee invol vem ent  schem es such as profi t  shari ng and
ESOP  arr angem ent s appears t o exert   a m oderati ng i nfl uence on t he wa g e - m oni t ori ng t r ade-
off .  I n addi t i on,  t he result s presented in Tabl e V II  suggest  t hat  t he t ype of em ployee
i nvol vem ent   schem e also aff ects t hi s t r ade-off .
VI . Fi nal   Co mme n t s
Thi s study ut i l i ses data fr om  a panel  of 127 French fi r m s over the peri od 1981-1991 t o
ascert ain  t he  r elati onshi p  bet w een pay,   supervi sion  and  em ployee shari ng.   Ou r   r esult s suggest
an inverse relati onshi p bet w een supervi sion and pay across bot h shari ng and non-shari ng
f i r ms ,  alt hough t he t r ade-off  is som ew hat assuaged w it hi n t he l att er.  In t erms  o f  specif i c
shari ng schem es,  i t  appears that  em ployee share ow nership pl ans are relati vel y m ore
successful  i n al l eviati ng t he need t o m oni t or,  wi t h t he rate of profi t  shari ng i m pacti ng
posi t i vel y  on  t he  l evel  supervi sion.
Som e cauti on i s, how ever,  wa r r anted. Al t hough i nt r ospect i on w oul d suggest
ot herwi se,  we   are unabl e t o  di sm iss t he  possibi l i t y  t hat   i t   i s supervi sion,   or  som e ot her  f actor,
wh i ch dri ves  em ployee shari ng.   I t   ma y   be  t he  case,  f or  exam ple,  t hat   ESOP  f i r ms   are able t o
econom i se on m oni t ori ng because t hey are r elati vel y mo r e r ecepti ve t o t he needs and desi r es
of  t hei r   em ployees,  w ho  t hem sel ves  r espond  posi t i vel y  t o  t hi s ethos,   wi t h  t he  i mp l em entati on
of  t he  ESOP  bei ng  but   one  of  m any  such by-product s.23A1
Appendi x
Tabl e I
Introduct i on  and  Abo l i t i on  of  Shari ng  Schem es
Numbe r   of   Fi rm s
1982 1984 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Introduced PS 0111423 1 4 61
Abo l i shed PS 1000100356
Introduced ESOP 0111212241
Abo l i shed ESOP 0012000131A2
Tabl e II
Sectoral   Di stribut i on  of  Fi rm s
Numbe r   of   Fi rm s
Eng/ Ca p Ag r i c E nergy Int  Gd s Mt r Ve h Te l ecom T ransp Services T otal
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( i )   Fi gures denot e t he  num ber  of  f i r ms   operati ng  a part i cular  shari ng  schem e wh e r e PS  =  profi t   shari ng  schem e;
ESOP  =  em ployee share ow nership  schem e;  NO  =  no  shari ng  schem e.
( i i )   Sam pl e used:   127  f i r ms   and  961  observat i ons.
( i i i )   Si nce a f i r m  ma y   have  bot h  shari ng  schem es,  t he  t ot al  num ber  of  f i r ms   wi t hi n  a part i cular  sector/ year  i s not
necessari l y  t he  sum  of  PS,   ESOP  and  NO.A3
Tabl e III
Va r i abl e Li st  and  De f i ni t i ons
27
VARI ABLE DEFI NI TI ON
BONUS Av e r age profi t   share bonus  per  f i r m
BONUS% ( BONUS  /   BASE  W AGE) *100%
EM PLOYM ENT Tot al  em ploym ent
ESOP  ONLY ESOP  d u mmy   vari able =  1  i f   ESOP  schem e i s present  and  profi t   shari ng  schem e i s
not   present
FEM ALE Per centage of  f em ale em ployees wi t hi n  t he  wo r k  f orce
BASE  W AGE Av e r age ( base)  salary  per  f i r m
FOREI GN Pe r centage of  f oreign  em ployees wi t hi n  t he  wo r k  f orce
MANAGE
28 Per centage of  m anageri al  staff   wi t hi n  t he  wo r k  f orce
OLD Pe r centage of  em ployees over  age-50  wi t hi n  t he  wo r k  f orce
PARTI ME P e r centage of  part - t i me   em ployees wi t hi n  t he  wo r k  f orce
PROFI TSHARE  ONLY Pr ofi t   shari ng d u mmy   vari able =  1 i f   profi t   shari ng schem e i s present  and ESOP
schem e i s not   present
PROFI TSHARE  &  ESOP Empl oyee shari ng  d u mmy   vari able =  1  i f   bot h  profi t   shari ng  and  ESOP  schem e are
present
SUPERVI SI ON Ra t i o  of  supervi sory  t o  non-supervi sory  em ployees
TOTAL  W AGE Fi xed  wa g e   +  bonus
TRAI N EX P Expendi t ure on  t r aini ng  per  em ployee
TURNOVER 0 . 5*[t ot al  entr i es ( i . e.  hi r i ng)  +  t ot al  exit s ( i . e.  f i r i ng  and  qui t s)]
YOUNG Pe r centage of  em ployees under  age-35  wi t hi n  t he  wo r k  f orce
27 Al l  m onet ary vari ables have been defl ated by t he G D P pri ce index,  base 1980.  Thi s defl ator is taken fr om
‘ The  A ccount s of  t he  Na t i on’.
28  No t e t hat   m anageri al  staff   are di sti nct   f r om   bot h  supervi sory  and  non-supervi sory  em ployees.A4
Tabl e IV
D escript i ve  St ati sti cs
Va r i abl eM i n M ax M ean Sub- Sam pl e M eans Sub- Sam pl e Me a n s
PS Non-
PS
T- St at ESO P N on-
ESOP
T- St at
BONUS% 5. 00 20. 00 5. 4 0------
EM PLOYM ENT 303 102902 5286 4539 5387 1. 42 8290 4797 3. 00c
FEM ALE 24. 00 90. 60 26. 60 30. 80 26. 10 3. 06c 29. 40 26. 20 2. 36b
FI XED  W AGE 28. 00 172. 50 79. 18 80. 00 79. 07 0. 44 82. 74 78. 68 1. 99b
FOREI GN 0 88. 60 7. 40 5. 60 7. 60 3. 59c 6. 60 7. 60 1. 47
MANAGE 2. 52 97. 00 13. 40 13. 50 13. 30 0. 28 13. 80 13. 30 0. 63
OLD 0 53. 50 18. 70 19. 90 18. 60 2. 50b 18. 45 18. 77 0. 68
PARTI ME 0 51. 20 3. 20 5. 10 2. 90 4. 09c 5. 90 2. 70 5. 66c
SUPERVI SE 0. 07 14. 00 2. 19 2. 02 2. 21 0. 71 2. 12 2. 21 0. 31
TOTAL  W AGE 28. 00 172. 50 79. 69 83. 93 79. 07 2. 32
b 84. 39 79. 02 2. 64
c
TRAI NEXP 0 34. 37 2. 47 2. 99 2. 40 1. 86a 2. 36 2. 49 0. 50
TURNOVER 0. 01 1. 46 0. 174 0. 20 0. 17 1. 67
a 0. 15 0. 18 1. 61
a
YOUNG 6. 00 86. 00 36. 40 33. 21 36. 84 3. 66c 36. 50 36. 40 0. 12
No t es:
1.   PS  =  Fi r ms   operati ng  a profi t   shari ng  schem e;  ESOP  =  f i r ms   operati ng  an em ployee share ow nership  schem e.
2.
a  Si gni f i cant  at  10  percent  l evel;  
b  Si gni f i cant  at  5  percent  l evel;  
c  Si gni f i cant  at  1 percent  l evel.   The  absolut e
val ue of the T-stati sti cs refers to t he si gni f i cance of the di f f erenti al bet we e n  t he shari ng and non-shari ng sub-
sam ple m eans.A5
Tabl e V:   Al l   Fi rm s
D ependent   Va r i able:  SUPERVI SE
Fi xed Ef f ects Es t i ma t i on
Specif i cati on ( i )( i i )( i i i )
Va r i abl e Co e f fT   St at C oeffT   St at C oeffT   St at
FOREI GN 0 . 596 1. 241 0. 610 1. 270 0. 580 1. 211
LOG  EM PLOYM ENT 0. 388 4. 490 0. 404 4. 635 0. 390 4. 530
LOG  TOTAL  W AGE - 2. 575 -6. 460 -2. 559 -6. 314 - -
LOG  FI XED  W A G E ---- - 2. 753 -6. 687
BONUS%
29 ---- 0 . 005 1. 131
LOG  TRAI NEXP 0 . 680 7. 815 0. 685 7. 844 0. 671 7. 827
MANAGE 4 . 945 8. 639 4. 992 8. 710 4. 920 8. 603
FEM ALE - 2. 388 -4. 425 -2. 463 -4. 521 -2. 557 -4. 692
PARTI ME - 2. 800 -2. 600 -2. 604 -2. 400 -2. 869 -2. 666
YOUNG - 0. 621 -1. 956 -0. 609 -1. 906 -0. 545 -1. 704
OLD - 1. 780 -4. 086 -1. 742 -3. 987 -1. 774 -4. 076
TURNOVER - 0. 463 -2. 067 -0. 413 -1. 825 -0. 478 -2. 137
PROFI TSHARE  ONLY - - 0 . 002 0. 072 - -
ESOP  ONLY - - - 0. 197 -1. 716 - -
PROFI TSHARE  AND  ESOP - - - 0. 022 -0. 180 - -
H ausm an  Chi   Squared St ati sti c 153. 488 153. 992 158. 163
R
2 0. 243 0. 244 0. 245
F  St ati sti c 31. 922 24. 805 29. 341
Nu mb e r   of  Fi r m s 127
Nu mb e r   of  Ob s e r vat i ons 961
29 The i nt ui t i on for enteri ng t he w age and bonus vari ables in t hi s form i s as fol l ow s:
( ) q q + = → + = + =
b ps b b ps w w w b w wl og l og 1  wh e r e  ( )
b w b = q   [ see W adhw ani   and  Wa l l   ( 1990)] .A6
Tabl e VI :
Shari ng/ No n  Shari ng  Di chotom y
D ependent   Va r i able:  SUPERVI SE
Fi xed Ef f ects Es t i ma t i on
Specif i cati on ( i v)
Shar i ng  Fi r ms
( PS  &/ or  ESOP)
( v)
N on  Shar i ng  Fi r ms
Va r i abl e Co e f fT   St at C oeffT   St at
FOREI GN 0 . 133 0. 744 2. 540 1. 818
LOG  EM PLOYM ENT - 0. 054 -0. 480 0. 438 4. 205
LOG  TOTAL  W AGE - 2. 274 -5. 728 -2. 764 -5. 489
LOG  FI XED  W A G E ----
BONUS% ----
LOG  TRAI NEXP 0 . 399 4. 811 0. 785 6. 623
MANAGE 9 . 206 9. 153 4. 095 6. 105
FEM ALE 0. 572 1. 390 -3. 279 -4. 599
PARTI ME - 1. 886 -1. 896 -2. 118 -1. 512
YOUNG 0 . 400 1. 166 -0. 706 -1. 838
OLD - 0. 150 -0. 406 -2. 307 -3. 962
TURNOVER 0 . 442 2. 188 -0. 623 -2. 156
H ausm an  Chi   Squared St ati sti c 21. 577 136. 470
R
2 0. 547 0. 241
F  St ati sti c 23. 689 24. 115
Nu mb e r   of  Fi r m s 34 103
Nu mb e r   of  Ob s e r vat i ons 188 728A7
Tabl e VI I
Prof i t   Shari ng/ ESOP  Di chotom y
D ependent   Va r i able:  SUPERVI SE
Fi xed Ef f ects Es t i ma t i on
Specif i cati on ( vi )
Pr ofi t   Shar i ng  On l y
( vi i )
Pr ofi t   Shar i ng  On l y
( vi i i )
ESOP  On l y
Va r i abl e Co e f fT   St at C oeffT   St at C oeffT   St at
FOREI GN 0 . 794 0. 910 1. 142 1. 337 0. 107 0. 807
LOG  EM PLOYM ENT 0. 067 0. 391 0. 237 1. 362 -0. 055 -0. 492
LOG  W AGE - 1. 563 -3. 799 - - -2. 656 -7. 342
LOG  BASE  W AGE - - - 1. 455 -3. 885 - -
BONUS% - - 0 . 066 3. 037 - -
LOG  TRAI NEXP 0 . 020 0. 196 0. 053 -0. 558 0. 977 9. 707
MANAGE 1 3 . 519 7. 293 14. 240 7. 795 5. 506 6. 544
FEM ALE - 0. 492 -0. 408 -1. 077 -0. 912 0. 298 0. 925
PARTI ME - 2. 735 -2. 424 -2. 120 -2. 047 2. 833 1. 969
YOUNG 0 . 078 0. 226 0. 295 0. 878 2. 098 5. 178
OLD 0 . 029 0. 060 0. 053 0. 116 -0. 091 -0. 271
TURNOVER 1 . 012 4. 325 0. 956 4. 213 -0. 844 -2. 939




2 0. 435 0. 473 0. 775
F  St ati sti c8 . 996 9. 484 37. 534
Nu mb e r   of  Fi r m s 23 15
Nu mb e r   of  Ob s e r vat i ons 104 106
30  The  m agni t ude  of  t he  H ausm an  Chi   Squared St ati sti c suggest s use  of  t he  r andom   eff ects m odel   i n  t he  case of
t hi s specif i cati on.   For   consi stency,  t he  r esult s f r om   t he  f i xed  eff ects esti ma t i on  are presented wh i ch do  not   di f f er
signi f i cantl y  f r om   t hose  deri ved  f r om   t he  r andom   eff ects m odel   ( avail able f r om   t he  authors on  r equest ) .
31  Gi ven  t he  sm all   sam ple size,  t he  H ausm an  Chi   Squared stati sti c cannot   be  calculated.A8
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